Some other notable innovations of the Alma-Ata Declaration warrant mention. First, it declared that 'cooperation between the parties in the Commonwealth shall be conducted in accordance with the principle of equality through coordinating bodies constituted on a basis of parity and operating under a procedure to be determined by agreements between the parties in the Commonwealth'. 15 This provision leaves no room for any 'weighted' representation or voting within the CIS. Second, it definitely stated that the Commonwealth 'is neither a State nor a supra-State entity'. 16 This point will be considered in more detail in a subsequent section of the article. Third, the CIS is open to accession by other States 'with the consent of all its participants'. 17 Hence the openness of the Commonwealth to other States (both members and non-members of the former Soviet Union) sharing its purposes and principles is combined with a consensus rule which is typical for associations of limited membership. Finally, the Alma-Ata Declaration confirmed the earlier statements of the three States to discharge, in accordance with 9 These were, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Republic ofMoktova, the Russian Federation (RSFSR), the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. -10 Georgia's non-participation in this process did not essentially alter the dissolution of the USSR, since a union presumes at least two members. At present Georgia tends observers to the CIS meetings and does not intend to become a member of the Commonwealth. 11 31ILM (1992) 147. 12
Ibid., at 149. 13 Schweisrurth, supra note 1, at 700. 14 Blum, 'Russia Takes Over die Soviet Union's Seat at the United Nations', 3 EJIL ( 
18
On the whole, the initial stage of the CIS formation provides reason to suppose that its founders shared no long-term plan and were therefore obliged to choose a cautious step by step approach. This was clearly seen in their attitude to the CIS institutional structure which was initially loose and lacked a clear statutory basis. The newly emerged independent States, especially Azerbaijan, 19 Moldova, 20 Turkmenistan 21 and Ukraine 22 were mindful of the experience of the Soviet Union central authorities, and were quite reluctant to create any powerful institutions which could threaten their newfound sovereignty. Instead of this, they put emphasis on the substantive, most of all economic, issues of relationships among the former members of the USSR, which urgently needed to be settled. Accordingly, during the first year of the CIS the participating States gave birth to more than 200 arrangements on economic, military, ecological, social and other matters. However, the quantity did not turn into the expected quality. Many decisions reached within the CIS did not work properly because of increasing disagreements among the members, which in turn fostered mutual distrust Some participating States (e.g.
See31DLM ( Ukraine) evidently gave preference to bilateral treaties, while others favoured the establishment of more compact sub-regional unions, such as the Central Asian common market which was established in early January 1993.23 In the meantime, the exigency of economic survival confronting all the Commonwealth members pushed them to put aside their fears and disappointments and to make new efforts to continue and improve the CIS. The hopes of active supporters of the Commonwealth (Kazakhstan, Russia) were pinned on the Minsk summit of 22 January 1993, whose key issue was the adoption of the CIS Charter.
24 But these hopes only partly materialized. The Charter was adopted by the Decision of the Council of Heads of State, but not all_participating parties signed it 25 All ten States signed a declaration reaffirming their belief in the potential of the Commonwealth and their determination to improve it Accession to the Charter by the founding States will need to be undertaken within a year, 2 ** and only afterwards can the legal image of the Commonwealth be somewhat clarified.
m. The Institutional Model of the CIS
The period of early evolution of the CIS has seen the confrontation of the two approaches to its institutional framework: (1) the CIS considered as a strong decision-making entity; and (2) the CIS viewed as a loose and merely consultative forum, a sort of 'presidents' club'. In any case, the institutional developments within the Commonwealth were in line with its nonsupranational coordinating status laid down by the initial founding documents. Apparently, trie CIS States had too much experience of excessive 'supranationalism' within the former Soviet Union to be willing to reanimate it On the other hand, the deep common historical roots and the high rate of integration and inter-dependence in practically all spheres of life of the former Soviet Republics could not be ignored in order to make their 'divorce' less painful. Moreover, the intensifying integration in other regions of the world, most of all in Europe, left a hope that the contrasting disintegration process within the borders of the former Soviet Union was a temporary consequence of the political clashes and errors in the prior integration practice, rather than a long-term trend.
In that situation the most natural, although probably not the most pragmatic, development was a gradual move from the simplest bilateral and multilateral forms of consultation and cooperation to a more elaborate institutional model in keeping with current international practice. A new strong institution could not be immediately set up from the ruins of the old one. A lengthy and complicated process of building a fully-fledged Commonwealth will succeed only as a result of a great deal of work, patience and trust on the part of its members. in time, the drafters of the constituent instruments have suggested the following institutional model for the OS.
A-Legal Nature
By the very term 'Commonwealth' the founders have brought to mind the structure of the Commonwealth of ex-British colonies, and have demonstrated their willingness to create a minimally institutionalized association with limited powers of its own as an antipode to the strongly centralized former Soviet Union. From the very beginning, tbe CIS has been shaped as a coordinating interstate association without any supranational powers. 27 Even the present-day institutional version of tbe CIS, considerably strengthened by the adoption of the Charter, along with a number of common features differs slightly from traditional inturgnvcmmental organizations, which mirrors the legal and institutional 'incompleteness' of tbe Commonwealth.
On the one hand, the CIS meets all the bask formal criteria of an intergovernmental organization, which are: (1) establishment on tbe basis of an international agreement in conformity with international law; (2) membership of sovereign States; (3) permanent functioning; (4) system of organs; (5) the objective of coordination of the Member States' cooperation in particular fields. This gave reason to some commentators to treat the CIS as an intergovernmental organization with the elements of confederation.
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On the other hand, it is plausible to suggest that at least at the pre-Charter stage, the Commonwealth was considered by its members merely as an international union of individual States, not as a separate legal entity. Even now, the CIS constituent instruments, including the Charter, lack any explicit provisions on the treaty-making competence of the Commonwealth, on its privileges and immunities, which might have been considered direct indicators of an international legal personality. Moreover, the modest legal practice of the CIS has not yet seen any striking examples of its independent international legal actions.
This must not, however, lead to a hasty conclusion that the Commonwealth has been intentionally deprived of the quality of an international legal person by its creators. The experience of many other international organizations shows that when a functional need for international legal action arises, the Member States can easily take an appropriate decision on the basis of the 'implied powers' concept 2 ' The CIS constituent instruments do not lay down any restrictions with regard to the decisions of the Council of Heads of State as a supreme organ of the Commonwealth. Inevitably, for example, the CIS and its Member States are supposed to regulate, most likely in the form of a traditional headquarters agreement, their relationships with the Republic of Belarus as tbe host State for most CIS bodies. Apart from the issues of treatymaking, the C^uiKil of Heads of State is empowered to take decisions on the joint use of military forces and on the sanctions that apply if a Member State breaches the CIS Charter.
27
See tbe Alma-Ata Declaration, Article 1 of the Charter. 28
Thai, Professor Schweisnmh, supra note 1, at 701 wrote that 'the CIS, having started at Minsk ts a simple "treaty community'', in the ensuing four months developed into an organized community of states, into a confederation, or, to put it in more "modern'* terms, into an international organization'. Pustogarov, supra note 1, at 29 noted that *the confederati ve elements make up a peculiarity of the CIS &s ft^* mTf rmtioi^" infcrffovffrnrncnttl o^pflniyftnon . Therefore, from the institutional viewpoint, the present-day CIS can be considered an intergovernmental organization which may act as an international legal person in the field of its competence on the basis of appropriate decisions of the supreme organ. The past experience of intergovernmental organizations provides every reason to suggest that at least certain attributes of international legal personality will be indispensable for the CIS if it is to properly discharge its basic functions.
B. The Fundamentals of Cooperation within the Commonwealth
The constituent instruments of the Commonwealth are more concerned with"the fundamentals of the Member States' cooperation, than detailed mechanisms, which will be specified in subsequent legal acts. In this respect, the CIS founding documents can hardly be compared, for example, with the detailed 1992 Treaty on European Union. similar to the European Community, while the political character of the Commonwealth would disappear after issues related to defence, boundaries, and other complex matters had been resolved.
C Membership
The Charter makes a distinction between the founding States, the Member States, die Associate Members and Observers. Pursuant to a decision of the Council of Heads of State, any State willing to participate in certain kinds of activities may accede to the Commonwealth as an Associate Member. The conditions of associate membership are to be specified in the relevant agreements. Finally, observer status may be granted to die representatives of non-members willing to attend die meetings of die Commonwealth bodies. Any Member State may withdraw from die Commonwealth by lodging a written notice with die depository of die Charter* 1 twelve months before die date of withdrawal.
42 Article 9 of die Charter states that die obligations that arose during die CIS membership remain binding upon die relevant States (including those willing to withdraw) until their 'complete fulfilment'. Clearly problems may arise at a later stage concerning the interpretation of this article.
On die whole, die provisions on membership are in line with die existing practice of international institutions and intend to clarify a somewhat ambiguous present-day status of die participating States witiiin the Commonwealm. The pre-Charter documents did not follow any uniform terminology widi regard to membership. 43 Moreover, in fact tiiere were and still remain different groups of CIS States: (I) die majority of die founding States which had ratified die Agreement Establishing the CIS and die Protocol to this Agreement, and (2) Azerbaijan and Moldova which had not ratified die constituent instruments but attended die CIS meetings as observers. The first group can also be subdivided into die CIS States which have signed die Charter, and those which have so far refrained from this.
Obviously, die Charter's flexible approach to membership is reasonable in view of die existing divergence in die positions of die potential members. It leaves die Commonwealth's door open both for those who strive for closer interaction and those who prefer to cooperate in a selective way.
D. The Commonwealth's Organs
Unlike its initial institutional model, which was very simple, die structure of bodies suggested by die Charter is more elaborate. may also be set up for cooperation in particular economic, social and other matters. It should however be stressed that the CMEA experience of the application of the 'being interested' principle illustrates its potential shortcomings. First, the Member States of the CIS may face problems which need a uniform decision, and the contracting-out of one or a few Member States would thwart this decision. Second, a broad application of contracting-out will inevitably lead to the establishment of a multitude of complicated regimes among various combinations of the Member States on the basis of the adopted decisions. Third, in the case of the CMEA, some commentators pointed out that the absence of any criteria for the definition of 'the interested member 1 can cause an abuse of the veto right They also suggested combining the principle of 'being interested' with an absolute unanimity nile on some fiwH»nyn»i jmqiff and majority voting on the less important matters.
58 Finally, the consensual rule can hardly work if a decision is to be taken against a Member State in the cases of dispute settlement or the use of sanctions.
These considerations should be borne in mind by the CIS founders in their efforts to move towards more elaborate institutional forms. The experience of other international institutions (e.g. the EEC) demonstrates that the decision-making machinery may evolve, along with the changes and developments within the relevant institution. The drafters of the Charter tried to combine a traditional arsenal of dispute-resolving means applied in international practice with a recourse in certain cases to the supreme and the specialized judicial organs. Such an approach, although not new as a whole, has one peculiarity: the permanent judicial organ has a specialized subject-matter. Hence, apart from the disputes on economic matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Economic Court, other disagreements shall be kept under the control of the parties, since even the Council of Heads of State can only address its recommendation to the disputing parties (another variant is unlikely in view of the consensus rule applied in the Council).
It is not clear from the CIS Charter if resort to the Economic Court in the event of an economic dispute is mandatory or depends on the discretion of the disputing parties. In the latter case, which is more likely, it will have to be specified whether a litigation in the Court can be initiate by a unilateral request of any of the disputants or only by their mutual consent. 
IV. Conclusion
From the formal institutional viewpoint, the present-day pattern of the CIS (albeit, it is unclear how viable it will be) meets the general criteria of an intergovernmental organization. However in substance, the Commonwealth does not have exact analogies with the existing state formations or interstate unions. 62 A brief comparative analysis bears out this view.
First, the CIS cannot be classified as a federation, since the founders explicitly stated that the Commonwealth 'is neither a State nor a supra-State entity'. 63 It follows that the Commonwealth as such cannot be in any way treated as a legal successor to the former USSR. 1982.68 in the meantime, unlike well-known confederations, the Commonwealth does not pursue a common foreign policy.
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In sum, the most likely institutional development within the Commonwealth is a multitude of legal regimes among different categories of participating States, including (1) a confederation-like nucleus represented by the States striving for closer forms of cooperation, and (2) a looser structure of legal links with other participating States based on various types of membership, reservations to constituent instruments and selective participation in the Commonwealth's legal acts. 
Charter of The Commonwealth of Independent States
The States voluntarily united into the Commonwealth of Independent States (hereinafter referred to as 'the Commonwealth'), On the basis of the historical communality of their peoples and the ties that have been formed between them.
Acting in accordance with the universally recognized principles and norms of international law, the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act, and other documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Desirous of ensuring by their common efforts the economic and social progress of their peoples.
Firmly resolved to put into practice the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States and of the Protocol to this Agreement, and also the provisions of the Alma-Ata Declaration, Promoting cooperation among themselves in the maintenance of international peace and security, and equally with an eye to supporting civil peace and inter-ethnic harmony.
Intending to create the conditions for preserving and developing the cultures of all the peoples of the Member States, 1
Translated from Russian by S -A. Vcritovich, revised by Iain L. Fnuer.
Annex
Desirous of improving the cooperation mechanisms within the Commonwealth and of increasing their efficiency.
Have decided to adopt the Charter of the Commonwealth and agreed the following:
Section 1 Objectives and Principles
Article 1 The Commonwealth shall be based on principles of sovereign equality of all its members. The Member States shall be independent subjects of international law having equal rights. The Commonwealth shall serve for the further development and strengthening of the relationships of friendship, good neighbourhood, inter-ethnic harmony, trust, mutual understanding and mutually advantageous cooperation among the Member States.
The Commonwealth shall not be a State, nor possess supranational powers.
Article 2
The objectives of the Commonwealth shall be: -cooperation in political, economic, ecological, humanitarian, cultural and other fields; -comprehensive and well-balanced economic and social development of the Member States within the framework of a common economic space, interstate cooperation and integration; -ensuring human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the universally recognized principles and norms of international law and the documents of the CSCE; -cooperation among the Member States in safeguarding international peace and security; -implementing effective measures for the reduction of armaments and military expenditures, for the elimination of nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, and for the achievement of universal and complete disarmament; -promoting free communication, contacts and movement within the Commonwealth for the citizens of the Member States; -mutual judicial assistance and cooperation in other spheres of legal relationships; -peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts among the States of the Commonwealth.
Article 3
For the achievement of the Commonwealth's objectives, the Member States shall, proceeding from the universally recognized norms of international law and the Helsinki Final Act, organize their relationships in accordance with the following interlinked and equipollent principles: -respect for the Member States' sovereignty, for the inalienable right of peoples to selfdetermination and for the right to determine their destiny freely without outside intervention; -the inviolability of States' boundaries, recognition of existing borders and rejection of unlawful territorial acquisitions; -the territorial integrity of States and rejection of any actions to split another's territory; -the non-use of force or the threat of force against the political independence of a Member State;
-the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, in order to avoid threatening international peace, security and justice; -the supremacy of international law in interstate relations; -non-intervention in each other's internal and external affairs; -the ensuring of human rights and fiinrinmental freedoms for all people without distinction of race, ethnic identity, language, religion, or political or other convictions; -bona fide fulfilment of obligations accepted in accordance with Commonwealth documents including the present Charter, -taking account of the interests of each other and of the Commonwealth as a whole; -and rendering assistance in all fields of their mutual relationships on a mutual consent basis; -combined effort and mutual aid in order to create peaceful living conditions for the peoples of the Commonwealth's Member States, and ensure their political, economic and social progress; -the development of mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technical cooperation and the broadening of the integration process; -the spiritual unity of their peoples based on respect for their distinctiveness, close cooperation in the preservation of cultural values and cultural exchange.
Article 4
The sphere of the Member States' joint activities conducted on an equitable basis, through common coordinating institutions in conformity with the obligations undertaken by the Member States within the Commonwealth, shall embrace: -ensuring human rights and fundamental freedoms; -coordination of foreign policy; -cooperation in the formation and development of a common economic space, of the Europewide and Eurasian markets, and of customs policy; -cooperation in developing transport and communication systems; -protection of health and the environment; -social and migration policy issues; -combating organized crime; -cooperation in the fields of defence policy and protection of external frontiers. The present list may be extended by the mutual consent of the Member States.
Article 5
The principal legal basis for interstate relationships within the Commonwealth shall be multilateral and bilateral agreements in various fields of the Member States' mutual relationships.
Agreements concluded in the Commonwealth framework shall conform with the objectives and principles of the Commonwealth, and the obligations of the Member States under the present Charter.
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Article 6
The Member States shall promote the cooperation and development of contacts between the State organs, public units, and economic structures.
Section II Membership
Article 7 The founding States of the Commonwealth shall be those 
Article 8
Pursuant to a decision of the Council of Heads of State, any State willing to participate in particular kinds of the Commonwealth's activities may accede to it as an Associate Member upon conditions to be laid down in an agreement on associate membership.
By a decision of the Council of Heads of State, representatives of other States may attend ' meetings of Commonwealth organs as observers.
Matters of participation by Associate Members and observers in the work of Commonwealth organs shall be regulated by the rules of procedure of such organs.
Article 9
Any Member State may withdraw from the Commonwealth. The Member State shall lodge written notice of such intention with the depository of the present Charter 12 months before the date of withdrawal.
Obligations that had arisen during die period of participation in the present Charter shall bind the relevant States until their complete fulfilment
Article 10
Breaches of the present Charter by a Member State or systematic non-compliance with a State's obligations under agreements reached within the Commonwealth or decisions of the Commonwealth organs shall be considered by the Council of Heads of State.
The measures allowed by international law may be applied in relation to such a State.
Section m Collective Security and Military and Political Cooperation
Article 11 The Member States shall conduct a coordinated policy in the field of international security, disarmament and armaments control, as well as in the building of the Armed Forces, and maintain security within the Commonwealth, in particular with the aid of groups of military observers and collective peace-keeping forces.
Article 12
In the event of a threat to the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of one or several Member States, or to international peace and security, the Member States shall immediately put into operation the mechanism of joint consultations for the purpose of coordinating their positions and taking measures to avert the threat that has arisen, including peace-making operations and, in the case of necessity, the use of the Armed Forces in realization of the right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article SI of the UN Charter.
A decision on the joint use of military forces shall be taken by the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth or by the Member States concerned, taking their national legislation into account
Article 13
Each Member State shall take appropriate measures to ensure stability at the external frontiers of the Commonwealth's Member States. On a basis of mutual consent, the Member States shall coordinate operations of border troops and other competent services which control and are in charge of maintaining the established order for crossing the external frontiers of the Member States.
Article 14
The supreme Commonwealth organ dealing with defence and protection of the Member States' external frontiers shall be the Council of Heads of State. Coordination of military-related economic activities of the Commonwealth shall be effected by the Council of Heads of Government.
Interaction among the Member States to implement international agreements and resolve other issues in the field of security and disarmament shall be organized through joint consultations.
Article 15
The concrete issues of military and political cooperation between the Member States shall be governed by special agreements.
Section IV Conflict Prevention and Dispute Settlement Articled
The Member States shall take all possible measures to prevent conflicts, primarily those arising on an interethnic and interconfessional basis, which might entail violation of human rights. On a basis of mutual consent, they shall render each other aid in resolving such conflicts, inter alia within the framework of international organizations.
Article 17
The Member States of the Commonwealth shall refrain from actions liable to injure other Member States or lead to aggravation of latent disputes.
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The Member States shall make efforts, in a spirit of good faith and cooperation, towards the just and peaceful resolution of their disagreements by means of negotiations, or the "wJiing of an understanding on a proper alternative procedure for dispute settle Should the Member States fail to resolve a dispute through the means mentioned in the second paragraph of this Article, they may refer the matter to the Council of Heads of State.
Article 18
The Council of Heads of State shall be empowered to recommend to the parties an appropriate procedure or methods for settling, at any stage of its evolution, a dispute whose continuation could threaten the maintenance of peace or security within the Commonwealth. 
Article 22
The Council of Heads of Government shall coordinate the cooperation of the Member States' organs of executive power in the economic, social and other spheres of common interests.
The Council of Heads of Government shall hold meetings four times a year. Extraordinary meetings of the Council may be convened on the initiative of the Government of one of tbe Member States.
Article 23
Decisions of the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government shall be taken by common consent -consensus. Any State may declare its not being interested in a particular question, which shall not be considered an impediment to the taking of a decision.
The 
Article 25
The Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government shall set up the working and auxiliary bodies for both permanent and temporary purposes.
These bodies shall be composed of the Member States' representatives endowed with appropriate full powers.
Experts and consultants may be invited to attend their meetings.
Article 26
Meetings of the heads of relevant State organs shall be convened to tackle matters of cooperation in particular fields and make recommendations to tbe Council 
Coordinating-Consultative Committee
Article 28
The Coordinating-Consultative Committee shall be the permanently operating executive and coordinating organ of the Commonwealth. 
Article 29
The Coordinating-Consultative Committee shall be composed of permanent plenipotentiary representatives, two from each Member State of the Commonwealth, and the Coordinator of the Committee appointed by the Council of Heads of State.
In order to provide administrative and technical assistance to the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Heads of Government and other organs of the Commonwealth, a Secretariat of the Coordinating-Consultative Committee, headed by the Coordinator of the Committee who shall be Deputy Chairman of the Coordinating-Consultative Committee, shall be set up.
The Committee shall operate in accordance with a Regulation to be adopted by the Council of Heads of State.
The seat of the Committee shall be the city of Minsk.
Council of Ministers of Defence High Command of the United Armed Forces Article 30
Council of Commanders of Border Troops
Article 31 
Economic Court Article 32
The Economic Court shall act with a view to ensuring the implementation of economic obligations within the Commonwealth. Disputes arising with regard to the implementation of economic obligations shall be within the jurisdiction of the Economic Court The Court may also resolve other disputes referred to its jurisdiction by agreements between Member States.
The Economic Court may interpret the provisions of agreements and other acts of the Commonwealth on economic issues.
The Economic Court shall act in accordance with the Agreement on the Status of the Economic Court and the Regulation on it to be adopted by the Council of Heads of State.
The seat of the Court shall be the city of Minsk.
Commission on Human Rights Article 33
The Commission on Human Rights shall be a consultative organ of the Commonwealth, and review compliance with Member States' obligations on human rights accepted in the Commonwealth framework. The Commission shall be composed of representatives of the Member States of the Commonwealth and operate on the basis of a Regulation to be adopted by the Council of Heads of State.
The seat of the Commission shall be the city of Minsk.
Organs of Sectoral Cooperation Article 34
On the basis of agreements among the Member States on cooperation in economic, social and other fields, organs of sectoral cooperation may be set up, which shall work out agreed principles and rules of sectoral cooperation and facilitate their practical realization. The organs of sectoral cooperation (councils, committees) shall discharge the functions provided for in the present Charter and the Regulations on them, ensuring multilateral consideration and resolution of cooperation issues in the relevant fields. 
Section IX Final Provisions
Article 41
The present Charter shall be subject to ratification by the founding States in accordance with their constitutional procedures. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Republic of Belarus, which shall notify the other founding States of the depositing of each instrument of ratification.
The present Charter shall enter into force for all founding States from the date of deposition of the instruments of ratification by all the founding States, or else, for those founding States which shall have deposited instruments of ratification, within one year of the adoption of the present Charter.
Article 42
Amendments to the present Charter may be proposed by any Member State. Proposed amendments shall be considered in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Council of Heads of State.
Amendments to the present Charter shall be adopted by the Council of Heads of State. They shall become effective, after ratification by all the Member States in accordance with their constitutional procedures, from the date of receipt of the last instrument of ratification by the Government of the Republic of Belarus.
Article 43
The founding States of the Commonwealth may on ratification of the present Charter make reservations and declarations on Sections m, IV, and VII, and Articles 28, 30,31, 32, 33.
Article 44
The present Charter shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.
Article 45
The present Charter has been made in a single original in the State languages of the founding States of the Commonwealth. The original shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the Republic of Belarus, which shall transmit a duly certified copy to each of the founding States.
The present Charter was adopted on 22 January 1993 at the meeting of the Council of Heads of State in the city of Minsk.
Declaration of the Council of Heads of the States-Participants of the CIS
The agreements reached in the Commonwealth framework, and the mechanisms worked out, allow the regulation by international legal means of issues of political, economic, humanitarian, military, and other kinds of cooperation.
The Heads of the States-participants of the CIS believe that the Commonwealth possesses an appropriate potential for improving its operation on the basis of the existing agreements. At the same time, all the participants in the meeting of Heads of State of the CIS at Minsk declare their Annex resolve to continue their efforts to increase the effectiveness of CIS action in economic and political fields.
The States which have signed and those which have not signed the Decision on the CIS Charter will concentrate their efforts first and foremost on the search for ways out of the economic crisis and for the establishment of efficient links among economic subjects in conditions of transition to market-economy relations.
The Heads of State consider it necessary successively to eliminate existing barriers in order to promote mutually beneficial economic cooperation.
The Heads of State consider that die relationships among the countries of the CIS, and especially the economic ones, will serve to ensure conditions for normal~cooperation among these countries.
